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MORATORY LEGISLATION BY CONGRESS
An Act recently passed by Congress and signed by the President
on March 8th, known as the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act, is
of great and immediate interest to the profession. Its aim is to pro-
tect persons in military service from certain hardships which may
result from their'absence and their inability to look after their business
interests at home.
The Act contains six Articles. Article I (entitled "General Provi-
sions") defines who are "persons in military service," and certain other
terms of the Act and provides that the Act is applicable "to the United
States, the several states and territories, the District of Columbia, and
all territory subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, and to
proceedings commenced in any court therein." It provides further that
certain relief granted under the Act may be given also with respect to
sureties, guarantors, indorsers, and other persons liable upon the con-
tract or liability in question.
[8O2]
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The principal provisions of Article 2 (entitled "General Relief") are
the following:
i. Before a judgment by default is entered in any court the plaintiff
shall file an affidavit stating that the defendant is not in military
service. In the absence of such an affidavit no judgment is to be
entered without first securing an order of court directing such entry;
and no such order shall be made if the defendant is in military service
until after the court shall have appointed an attorney to represent him.
Unless it appears that the defendant is not in military service the court
may require as a condition before judgment is entered that the plaintiff
file a bond to indemnify the defendant, if in military service, against
any loss or damage that he may suffer by reason of any judgment,
should the judgment be thereafter set aside. It will be seen that the
provisions of this Article affect all judgments by default in any court
whether the defendant is in military service or -ot.
2. Judgments rendered against any person in military service dur-
ing the period of such service or within thirty days thereafter may be
opened not later than ninety days after the termination of such service
if it appear that the defendant was prejudiced by reason of his military
service in making his defense to such action or proceeding.
3. Any action or proceeding commenced in any court by or against
a person in military service during the period of such service or within
sixty days thereafter shall be stayed on application of such person or
some person on his behalf, or may be stayed in the discretion of the
court on its own motion, unless the ability of the plaintiff to prosecute
the action or of the defendant to conduct his defense is not materially
affected by reason of his military service.
4. In an action or proceeding commenced in any court against a
person in military service, before or during the period of such service,
or within sixty days thereafter, the execution of any judgment or order
entered against such person may be stayed and any attachment or
garnishment of property, money, or debts in the hands of another may
be vacated or stayed, unless the ability of the defendant t6 comply
with the judgment or order is not materially affected by reason of his
military service.
5. The period of military service is not to be included in computing
any period limited by any law for the bringing of any action by or
against any person in military service or by or against his heirs, execu-
tors, administrators or assigns, whether such cause of action shall have
accrued prior to or during the period of such service.
Article 3 of the Act deals with "Rents, Installment Contracts,
Mortgages."
i. It forbids eviction or distress in respect of any premises the
rental of which does not exceed $50 per month, and which are occupied
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chiefly for dwelling purposes by the wife, children or other dependents
of a person in military service, except upon leave of court. The court
may stay proceedings for not longer than three months, and shall do so
on application, unless the ability of the tenant to pay the agreed rent
is not materially affected by reason of such military service, or it may
make such other order as may seem just. The Secretary of War or
the Secretary of the Navy is empowered to order an allotment of the
pay of a person in military service, in reasonable proportion, to dis-
charge the rent.
2. Parties to whom a deposit or an installment of the purchase
price has been paid under a contract contemplating the purchase of real
or personal property by persons who after such date of payment have
entered military service, are prohibited from rescinding or terminating
the contract or resuming possession of the property for non-payment of
any installment falling due during the period of such service, except by
action in a court of competent jurisdiction. Upon the hearing of such
an action the court may order the re-payment of prior installments or
deposits or any part thereof as a condition of terminating the contract
and restiming possession of the property, or in its discretion may, on
its own motion, and shall, on application to it by such person in mili-
tary service or some person on his behalf, order a stay of proceedings,
unless in the opinion of the court the ability of the defendant to comply
with the terms of the contract is not materially affected by reason
of such service; or it may make such other disposition of the case
as may be equitable to conserve the interests of all parties.
3. With respect to obligations originating prior to the daie of the
approval of the Act which are secured by mortgage, trust deed, or
other security in the nature of a mortgage upon real or personal
property owned by a person in military service, it is provided that in
any proceeding commenced in any court during the period of military
service to enforce such obligation, arising out of non-payment of any
sum due thereunder or out of any other breach of the terms thereof,
occurring prior to or during the period of such service, the court,
after hearing, in its discretion may on its own motion, and shall, on
application to it by such person in military service or some person on
his behalf, unless in the opinion of the court the ability of the
defendant to comply with the terms of the obligation is not materially
affected by reason of his military service, (a) stay the proceedings or
(b) make such other disposition of the case as may be equitable to
conserve the interests of all parties. No sale under a power of sale
or under a judgment entered upon warrant of attorney to confess
judgment contained in any such obligation shall be valid if made dur-
ing the period of military service or within three months thereafter,
unless upon an order of sale previously granted by the court and a
return thereto made and approved by the court.
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The provisions of Article 4 (entitled "Insurance") aim to protect
persons in the military service who shall apply for the benefits of this
Act against the lapsing of any policy or policies of insurance which
they may carry not exceeding in each case a face value of $5ooo.
The provisions of Article 5 (entitled "Taxes and Public Lands")
aim to protect the rights which persons in military service may have
in any public lands and to protect such persons against the con-
sequences resulting from the non-payment of taxes or assessments
falling due during the period of military service in respect of real
property owned and occupied for dwelling or business purposes by a
person in military service or his dependents.
Article 6 (entitled "Administrative Remedies") lays down, as the
title indicates, various administrative remedies.
The outbreak of the war gave such a shock to the financial systems
of the various belligerent countries in Europe that they found it
necessary to declare immediately moratoriums extending for specified
times the period within which payments might be made. Such a
moratorium was put into effect in England by proclamation on August
2, 1914, and was confirmed by what is known as the Postponement of
Payments Act, which was passed by Parliament on the following day.
The Act conferred authority on the King to postpone the payment of
all contract obligations and provided that it was to remain in force
for a period of six months. No such legislation was required in this
country after its entry into the war because our financial system had
already adapted itself to the new conditions created by the war.
Special legislation was required, however, to meet the needs of those
entering the military service. Laws aiming to protect their interests
were passed in Europe promptly after the outbreak of the war. In
Germany such a law was passed on August 4, 1914; in France, on
August 5, 1914; and in England, on August 31, 1914. The English
Act, which is known as the Courts Emergency Powers Act, was
amended twice in 1916 and again in 1917. In this country it has
required a much longer time to enact the necessary legislation in behalf
of our men in the military service. Maryland was one of the first
states to realize the need of prompt action and it passed the necessary
legislation at the special session of its legislature in 1917. It was
almost a year after the declaration of war before the Congress of the
United States took the matter in hand. By providing a very compre-
hensive statute on the subject, it has made further state legislation with
reference to the matter unnecessary.
In the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act we have a striking
instance of Congressional action based upon the constitutional power
to declare war, to support armies, to maintain a navy, and "to make all
laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution
the foregoing powers."
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The Act is a vast improvement upon the English model and is a
fine piece of legislation, both as regards substance and legislative
draftsmanship.
CAN A SOLDIER UNDER AGE MAKE A VALID WILL?
When a nation is in arms questions which have been thought only
of academic interest may become of large practical moment. The age
at which a soldier or sailor attains testamentary capacity is an instance
in point, for the armies and navies of the warring nations contain
many boys under 21. A recent English case involved the will of an
infant officer of the British army who attempted to dispose of
£I,oOo,ooo over which he had a testamentary power of appointment.
He was killed in action, while still an infant, and his will was admitted
to probate as a soldier's will under section ii of the Wills Act of
1837. Section 7 of the Act declares that no will made by any person
under 21 years of age shall be valid; sections 9 and io prescribe the
formalities for executing wills; and section ii reads: "Provided
always and be it further enacted, That any soldier being in actual
military service, or any mariner or seaman being at sea, may dispose
of his personal estate as he might have done before the making of this
Act." Questions arising as to the validity of the attempted exercise
of the power of appointment, the case came before the Chancery Divi-
sion. It was held that so long as the probate stood unrevoked the testa-
mentary power of appointment was validly exercised; but the learned
judge expressed the opinion that the practice of admitting to probate
wills of infant soldiers was not justified by the Wills Act and that if
the question should come before the Court of Appeals it would be
necessary under existing legislation to declare such wills invalid. Re
Wernher (1918, Ch. D.) 117 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) Soi.
The age at which a person shall be deemed to have legal capacity
to make a will depends upon the provisions of the statute governing
the'making of wills. American statutes closely follow those of Eng-
land-either the Statute of Frauds of 1676 or the present Wills Act
of 1837. The tendency of modem legislation has been to advance
the age of testamentary capacity and many of the American states"
now place it at 21, as does section 7 of the Wills Act. Likewise
many of the American statutes2 have provisions favoring the wills of
soldiers and sailors and corresponding to section ii of the Wills Act.
The English decisions therefore will be of value in helping to solve
under American statutes the problem whether a soldier under age can
make a valid will.
See I Schouler, Wills (sth ed.) secs. 39-43; Rood, Wills, sec. 126 et seq.
See I Schouler, op. cit. sec. 365 et seq.; Rood, op. cit. sec. 238.
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The opinion of Justice Younger in the principal case contains so
admirable a review of the origin and history of the special favor
which the law shows to soldiers and sailors in the making of wills that
it would be useless to attempt to add to it.8 But a summary of his
argument may be of interest to American readers. Prior to the
Statute of Frauds no formality of execution, nor even a writing, was
required for the testamentary disposition of personal estate, and testa-
mentary capacity was deemed to exist at the age of 14 for males and
12 for females. When the Statute of Frauds introduced ceAain
forms and solemnities into the making of wills of personalty it was
thought expedient to reserve-as was done by section 23--their for-
mer privileges to soldiers in actual military service and to sailors at
sea, because their peculiar circumstances rendered it more difficult
for them to observe the forms required of testators in ordinary cir-
cumstances. The Statute of Frauds contained no provision as to the
age required for testamentary capacity and the reservation by section
23 of the soldier's privilege did not lower the age at which he was
competent to make a will. It simply did away with the formalities of
execution. 5 With this survey of the earlier law, it seems clear that sec-
tion ii of the Wills Act does not affect the capacity to make a will-
the age of capacity being fixed at 21 years by section 7, just as before
that Act it had been fixed at 14 years for males by the established
common-law rule, unchanged by the Statute of Frauds-but reserves
merely the privilege of disregarding formalities of execution, just as
did section 23 of the Statute of Frauds. And this is made the clearer
by reason of the form of section ii which is that of a proviso follow-
ing sections 9 and io which deal with the formalities of execution.
Moreover, it is to be noticed that the privilege reserved extends only
to the soldier who is in actual military service. When he returns to
civil life it ceases. Now if the reservation were intended to confer
capacity to make a will regardless of age how extraordinary it would
be to withdraw it when the soldier returns to civil life, and thus leave
him unable, until he should reach majority, to alter or revoke by a
later will his military will.
The court's argument demonstrates beyond question the soundness
of its interpretation of the statute. Yet the English text writers have
'The special testamentary privilege extended to soldiers and sailors was bor-
rowed by the common law from the civil law. 2 Justinian, Institutes, Title ii.
See Drummond v. Parish (1843, Eng.) 3 Curt. Eccl. Rep. 522, 531; also Leathers
v. Greenacre (i866) 53 Me. 56r, 570.
" Section 23 reads: "Provided always: That notwithstanding this Act, any
soldier being in actual military service, or any mariner or seaman being at sea,
may dispose of his moveables, wages, and personal estate, as he or they might
have done before the making of this Act."
'This was the construction placed upon the privilege under the civil law. See
Swinburne, Wills, 6i.
0 1 Jarman, Wills (6th ed.) io2; Theobald, Wills (7th ed.) 56.
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been accustomed to assert that soldiers in actual military service and
sailors at sea may make wills of personalty at the age of 14, and it
has been the practice of the English courts of probate to admit to
probate the wills of soldier-infants. But, as Justice Younger points
out, this rule and this practice originated in a case in which probate
was granted on ex parte motion and without any adequate considera-
tion.7
American text writers have been strangely silent on the subject. No
discussion of the problem has been found in any of them. There is,
however, one American decision which supports the view of Mr.
Justice Younger." It is believed that in this country as well as in
England additional legislation will be necessary if soldiers or sailors
are to have testamentary capacity at an earlier age than civilians.
WHAT IS COMMERCE?
It has been suggested in two legal periodicals' and held in two
recent cases that interstate transportation of property by the owner for
purely personal use is not interstate commerce. United States v.
Mitchell (I9I7, S. D. W. Va.) 245 Fed. 6oi.2 But inasmuch as there
ire at least two decisions squarely contra8 and apparently none in
accord, and inasmuch as the solution of the question goes to the very
root of the whole commerce clause of the Constitution, the problem
seems to be doubly worthy of consideration.
What, then, is commerce, or rather what is commerce in the sense
in which that term is used in the Constitution? The specific aspect of
this question as it arose in the principal case was whether the owner
of intoxicants who personally carries the same from one state to
another, not for purposes of trade but for personal use, is transport-
ing intoxicants in interstate commerce. The court held that such a
transaction is not interstate commerce for the reason that the term
commerce "necessarily connotes" a business transaction. But does
the term commerce, in the sense in which it is used in the Constitution,
"necessarily connote" a so-called "commercial" transaction? It was
argued in the leading case on interstate commerce that commerce was
limited to traffic, but Mr. Chief Justice Marshall, speaking for the
court, irrefutably answered the argument with the observation that
"this [limitation] would restrict a general term, applicable to many
"Re Farquhar (1846) 4 Notes of C. 651; see also Re M'Murdo (1867) L. P_ i
P. & D. 54o; Goods of Hiscock [igoi] P. 78.
8 Goodell v. Pike (1867) 40 Vt. 319.
(1903) 3 COLUmBIA L. REV. 411; (1898) 12 HARV. L. REV. 353.
'The other case, from the Northern District of West Virginia, is unreported.
'State v. Holleyman (1899) 55 S. C. 207, 33 S. E. 366; Alexander v. State
(1910) 3 Okla. Cr. 478, lo6 Pac. 988.
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objects, to one of its significations."4 If, then, as the Supreme Court
has repeatedly held, the term "commerce" as used in the Constitution
"is a term of the largest import,"" and cannot be restricted "to one
of its significations," it becomes important to ascertain what the
"largest import" of the term is-what "its significations" are. Accord-
ing to the best authorities the word commerce has two principal
"significations": (i) business intercourse, and (2) social or personal
intercourse.7 Moreover, this latter significaiion was the more widely
developed in the early use of the word commerce and has ever since
been quite common." Furthermore, it may be appropriately observed
that the word commerce comes from the Latin word commercium
which, like its English derivative, has a double and very comprehen-
sive meaning: (i) commercial intercourse, (2) non-commercial inter-
course.9 For example, the Romans spoke of a social exchange of
letters as commerce (commercium),10 and, in fact the word commerce
is still used to convey that meaning or similar meanings."' The deriva-
tive word commercial, however, has been confined to only "one of the
significations" of the root word commerce, viz., to business transactions,
and doubtless it is partly to this conception that the holding in the
principal case must be attributed. But the power given to Congress
was to "regulate commerce," not to "regulate commercial transactions."
Therefore, to use again the language of Mr. Chief Justice Marshall,
the holding in the principal case, if correct, would "restrict a general
term, applicable to many objects, to one of its significations,'---such a
restriction the great expounder of the Constitution held could not be
made.
Such being the "large import" of the term, the next important
question is whether in giving Congress the power to regulate inter-
state commerce the broad purpose-the evil sought to be remedied-is
necessarily confined to purely business or so-called "commercial"
transactions. "It is a matter of public history that the object of vest-
ing in Congress the power to regulate interstate commerce was to
insure uniformity of regulation against conflicting and discriminat-
ing state legislation 12 Hence, the principal purpose of the commerce
clause was to prevent interference by a state with the free interstate
"Gibbons v. Ogden (1824, U. S.) 9 Wheat i, i8g. Italics in the quotation
are the writer's.
'Welton v. State of Missouri (1875) 91 U. S. 275, 28o.
' Gibbons v. Ogden, supra.
" See Century Dictionary and Encyclopedia, and Webster's New International
Dictionary.
" See Webster's New International Dictionary.
'See Harper's Latin Dictionary.
o Id. See, also, Seneca, Epistolae, 38, z.
"See, e. g., Emerson, Friendship; and Century Dictionary.
' County of Mobile v. Kimball (I88o) Io2 U. S. 691, 697.
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transportation of persons or property. Does not this purpose, then,
cover transactions like that in the principal case? It is difficult to see
why it does not, for if such interstate transportation is not interstate
commerce then one wishing to transport his own property for personal
use from, say, New York to San Francisco might be subjected to
all sorts of "conflicting and discriminating state legislation." For
instance, suppose that A has a pleasure car which he never uses for
"commercial" purposes and he wishes to drive it from New York to
San Francisco for purely pleasure purposes. Could each state tax
him for the mere privilege of crossing the state line? Or could the
interlying states put prohibitive taxes on the flask of brandy which
he carries in his pocket for the purpose of use in case of accident?
It would seem clear that such transactions fall within the general
purpose of the commerce clause and, hence, constitute interstate com-
merce.
Perhaps the most satisfactory judicial exposition of the term is the
one recently quoted with approval by the United States Supreme Court
in International Textbook Co. v. Pigg.3 Said the court:
"Importation into one state from another is the indispensable
element, the test of interstate commerce, and every negotiation, con-
tract, trade and dealing . . . which contemplates and causes such
importation whether it be of goods, persons or information is a trans-
action of interstate commerce."
The omitted words are, "between citizens of different states," but
it seems quite clear that diverse citizenship has nothing to do with
commerce. And, besides, the Supreme Court has recently held that
transportation by the owner for himself, i. e., transportation not
"between citizens of different states" may be commerce.14 In other
words, as it was more concisely expressed by the United States
Supreme Court in Railroad Co. v. Husen, 15 "transportation is essential
to cpmmerce or rather is commerce itself," i. e., commerce in the con-
stitutional sense is simply transportation (including transit and trans-
mission) of persons or things. Moreover, this conception of the term
commerce, viz., as simply transportation of persons or things, seems
to be carried out by the unbroken current of Supreme Court decisions.
Thus, Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for the United States Supreme
Court, has said :16 "Transportation for others as an independent busi-
ness is commerce irrespective of the purpose to sell or retain the goods
(I910) 217 U. S. 91, 30 Sup. Ct 481. The quotation is froth Butler Shoe Co.
v. United States Co., I56 Fed. i.
"The Pipe Line Cases (914) 234 U. S. 548, 34 Sup. Ct. 956.
(1877) 95 U. S. 465, 470.
'Hanley v. Kansas City, etc. Co. (19o3) 187 U. S. 617, 61g; 23 Sup. Ct
214, 215.
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which the owner may entertain with regard to them ... ." It is true
that the learned justice says transportation for others is commerce,
irrespective of the purpose, but the case was a case dealing with trans-
portation for others, and a judge usually, and wisely, confines his
language as nearly as possible to the facts of the case. Besides, the
same learned justice, speaking for the same court, has subsequently
held that the fact that the transportation is by and for the owner of
the thing transported (i. e., the fact that it is transportation not for
others) does not prevent the transportation from being interstate com-
merce.1 7  Hence, it would seem to follow that interstate transporta-
tion is interstate commerce, irrespective of the purpose of the
transportation or of the person for whom the person or thing is
transported.
Furthermore, apart from Congressional legislation, such as now
exists,18 it is settled law that a state cannot prevent a person from
importing (through another) intoxicants for his own personal use,
the reason being that such importation is interstate commerce.' 0 But
if the principal case is correct the state could without such congres-
sional legislation prevent him from personally importing it into the
state. In other words, if the principal case is correct, then what is
admittedly commerce if done by an agent ceases to be commerce if
done by the principal himself. But such a conclusion seems absurd,
for certainly the essential nature of the transaction is the same whether
it is done by the principal himself or by his paid agent.
In accord with the view herein expressed is the well-reasoned
opinion of the Supreme Court of South Carolina in a case in which
the facts were substantially the same as in the principal case but the
conclusion reached was squarely contra. In that case20 the defendants
had purchased liquor in North Carolina and had transported it in their
own buggy into South Carolina, for their own personal use. The
court held that the transportation was interstate commerce, though it
was transportation by the owner for his own non-commercial use.
The only other case squarely in point seems to be Alexander v. State.
2'
There, too, the accused had personally carried liquor into the state
for his personal use, but the court did not hesitate to hold the trans-
portation interstate commerce, although it was, as in the principal
case, a transportation by the owner for a non-commercial purpose.
Text-writers, as a rule, have wholly ignored the precise point raised
in the principal case and do not cite either of the two cases last con-
1 The Pipe Line Cases, supra.
"' See CommENT, The Webb-Kenyon Act and Interstate Commerce (1917) 26
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1,Vance v. W. A. Vandercook (x898) 170 U. S. 438, i8 Sup. Ct. 674.
"State v. Holleyman, supra.
"Supra, note 3.
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sidered. But upon principal and such authority as there is, it is sub-
mitted that the distinction taken in the principal case and suggested
in the above-mentioned periodicals cannot be supported; that it is not
practical to draw any distinction between transportation by the owner
for so-called "commercial'" and transportation by the owner for
.so-called "non-commercial" purposes; that each is commerce in the
constitutional sense; that to hold so does violence neither to language
nor to legal principle, but rather gives full effect to the "largest
import" of the term commerce, enables Congress to regulate evils
which would seem to fall clearly within the general purpose of the
commerce clause, and finally, while effectuating complete justice,
avoids the adoption of a wholly impractical and unnecessary limitation
to a just and practical general rule.
T. P. H.
THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE APPLIED TO ACTS OF MEXICAN
REVOLUTIONISTS
The United States Supreme Court in two recent decisions has made
an interesting application of the Act of State doctrine. Oetien v.
Central Leather Co. (1918) 38 Sup. Ct. 3o9; Ricaud v. American
Metal Co. (1918) 38 Sup. Ct. 312. Both cases arose out of the acts
of a military commander of the Constitutionalist Army in Mexico. In
the first case personal property of a Mexican citizen had been seized
for non-payment of a military contribution duly levied, and in the
second case personal property claimed to have been owned by an
American corporation had been seized on military requisition. In both
cases, the property was sold by the military commander to an American
citizen, who brotight it into the United States, and suit for the recovery
of the property was instituted-in the first case, by the American
assignee of the original Mexican owner, and in the second case, by the
alleged original American owner. The court was asked to decide upon
the conflicting claims of title of two American citizens.
The lower court in the first case' decided that by the seizure and
sale of the military commander title passed to the defendants, on the
ground that war existed, that the contribution was properly levied
under the laws of war, and that a sale of an inhabitant's property, for
failure to pay the contribution, assessed against him, was valid. That
is, the court examined the legality of the seizure and- sale according to
the rules of international law.
The United States Supreme Court proceeded on an entirely different
theory. It refused to examine the legality of the seizure and sale. It
'O'Neill and Oetien v. Central Leather Co. (1915, Ct Err.) 87 N. J. L.
552, 94 AtI. 789.
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turned its attention solely to the character of the authorities making the
seizure and sale, and finding, in both cases, that the political depart-
ment of our Government had since recognized, first, the de facto and
subsequently, the de jure character of the Government on behalf of
whose armies the seizures and sales were made, it declined to
re-examine or sit in judgment upon the acts of a foreign government
carried out within its own territory; and this, notwithstanding the
fact that the property thus sold was brought into the United States
and the conflict of title arose between two American citizens. Redress
of grievances by reason of such acts of a foreign government, said the
court, must be sought in the courts of that government or through
diplomatic channels.
A decision of the United States District Court for the District of
California in the unreported case of Union Fertilizer Co. v. Atchison,
Topeka and Santa F6 Railroad Co. (March, 1917) seems to have
been at variance with these conclusions. A concession granted by Diaz
in 1911 to one S. to gather guano from certain islands off Lower Cali-
fornia was cancelled in 1914 and granted to A. by a Constitutionalist
Governor then exercising military authority in the region. A. brought
the guano to the United States and sold it to the plaintiff, billing it
to the plaintiff on the defendant railroad. S., the original conces-
sionaire, demanded and obtained the guano from the railroad, claiming
to be the true owner, and this title the defendant set up in an action
by the plaintiff for recovery of the value of the guano. The court
held that the Constitutionalist authorities could take private property
only for immediate military needs, which necessity in this case was
not shown, and that the concession of S. was a vested right which the
Constitutionalists could not disturb. It is submitted that, however
valid this complaint might be if advanced by the political department
of our Government, an American court, as held in the principal cases
by the Supreme Court, should not have passed upon the validity of the
acts of the Constitutionalist authorities, nor assumed to examine a
question of title to an interest in Mexican realty.2
The same principle which induces the courts to refrain from drawing
into question or passing upon acts of the political department of our
'Moreover, the decision is open to the further objection that, on common
law principles, S. could not have brought an action for the guano in question
against A or those claiming under him, on the ground that a disseizee cannot sue
his disseizor or those claiming under him for the disseizor's wrongful acts with
respect to the property or for anything taken from the land so long as the
disseizin continues. The disseizee in such case must either first regain posses-
sion by legal action or otherwise, and then bring his action for injury to the
property or for the personalty removed therefrom, or recover for those injuries
as an incident to his action to regain possession. He cannot sue the disseizor
for the tort independentb; until he has come into possession. Avery v. Spicer
(1916) 9o Conn. 576, 581, 98 Atl. 135, and other cases there cited.
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own government acting within its jurisdiction' would a fortiori exempt
from similar examination the acts of a foreign government acting
within its jurisdiction,4 even though such acts affect the property of
American citizens in its territory. The reason for the rule in the first
case is based upon the inconvenience that would result from the courts
interfering with the acts of the political department when acting
within its jurisdiction. That reason is fortified in the case of acts
of a foreign government by the fact that a re-examination of such
acts in municipal courts would "imperil the amicable relations between
governments" and by the further fact that individual recourse is not
barred, but is merely directed to be sought in other quarters, namely,
in the courts of the foreign country or through a diplomatic claim
instituted on behalf of the citizen by the foreign office of his own
government.
This immunity from re-examination of Acts of State of a foreign
government extends to acts of legislation
5 and executive acts,8 but is
predicated upon their operation having been confined within the proper
limits of the jurisdiction of that government.
7  Still, while it would be
impossible to justify acts committed under authority of State A. in
State B. contrary to the laws of State B., judicial cognizance of such
acts in State B. can be taken collaterally only, and only so far as they
affect private rights, and not directly, when they involve an assump-
tion of jurisdiction over State A. or its property. Convenience and
"In the field of foreign relations, see Foster v, Neilson (1829, U. S.) 2 Pet.
253, 307; Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co. (1839, U. S.) 13 Pet. 415, 420; In re
Cooper (1891) 143 U. S. 472, 499; 12 Sup. Ct 453. In England see West
Rand Central Gold Mining Co. v. The King [195o] 2 K. B. 391.
' Underhill v. Hernandez (1897) 68 U. S. 250, 253; 18 Sup. Ct. 83; American
Ban na Co. v. United Fruit Co. (1909) 213 U. S. 347, 359; 29 Sup. Ct 51.
5Carr v'. Fracis Times & Co. (H. of L.) [19o2] A. C. 176, i8o. No such
immunity from re-examination extends to the legislation of one state in the
courts of another state of the United States, nowithstanding the "full faith and
credit" requirement of the Constitution for the "public acts" of sister states.
Of course, this matter is independent of the question of enforcement of a foreign
statute, which is not required by international or interstate law. See articles
by Judge J. K. Beach in (1918) 27 YALE LAW ,OvJoJRAL, 656, and by Henry
Schofield in (9o8) 3 ILL. L. REV. 65.
' American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., supra.
See Dobree v. Napier (1836, Eng. C. P.) 2 Bing. N. C. 781 (acts on the high
sea under authority of Queen of Portugal, when not in violation of international
law, held not justiciable in English courts). In Reg. v. Lesley (I86o) 29 L. J.
M. C. 97, an act done under the authority of a foreign state (Chile) on the
high seas by an English vessel, contrary to English law, did not escape judicial
condemnation in England, because Chilean law had no extraterritorial effect on
an English ship outside Chilean waters. See also Vavasseur v. Krupp (1878,
C. A.) 9 Ch. D. 359, where it was said that infringement of a patent in
England could not be justified by alleging that it was done under authority of a
foreign sovereign.
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comity among nations operate to exempt foreign sovereigns and their
property from the jurisdiction of municipal courts.'
An exception to the general rule that the legality of the acts of a
foreign government (apart from those committed within the territory
of the forum contrary to local law) will not be examined in judicial
proceedings, is to be noted in the case of prize captures made under
authority of a foreign state but in violation Qf the neutrality of the
state into which the prize is brought. As was said by Justice Story in
The Santissima Trinidad:
"In each case, . . . the illegality of the capture is the same; in each,
the duty of the neutral is equally strong to assert its own rights, and
to preserve its own good faith, and to take from the wrongdoer the
property he has unjustly acquired, and reinstate the other party in his
title and possession which have been tortiously divested."' 0
When we come to the judgments of foreign courts, however, we find
that recognition of such judgments is not treated as obligatory but is
based on the doctrine of comity and is qualified by the universal rule
that the court rendering the judgment shall have had jurisdiction in
the international sense.'1
Had the plaintiffs in the instant cases been able to proceed in tort in
this country against the individuals who committed the alleged wrong,
they would still have had to show that the act was unlawful in the
place where committed, i. e., Mexico, 12 even if the defendants could not
have pleaded the Act of State to escape personal liability.' 3
Although the acts of seizure by the military commanders were com-
mitted before their revolution became successful, their acts from the
beginning of the revolution are considered as those of the government
'Vavasseur v. Krupp, supra. In The Parlement Beige (i88o, C. A.) 5 P. D.
197, the Court of Appeal held that when a foreign sovereign claims property
as the public property of his state, that declaration cannot be inquired into.
'(1822, U. S.) 7 Wheat. 283, 351.
'See also The Estrella (18ig, U. S.) 4 Wheat 298, 308; The Steamship
Appam (917) 243 U. S. 124, 154; 37 Sup. Ct 337, 342.
1 So in Rose v. Himely (1808, U. S.) 4 Cranch. 241, the Supreme Court dis-
regarded the judgment of a San Domingan court, because founded on a jurisdic-
tion acquired by seizure of an American vessel in the open sea. A sale made
under that judgment was held insufficient to divest the title of the American
owner. Had the court had jurisdiction, the judgment of condemnation "would
have been regarded as conclusive on all the world. See paper of Mr. Justice
Kennedy, To what extent should judicial action by courts of a foreign nation be
recognized? in (39o4) Official Report of the Universal Congress of Lawyers and
Jurists, St Louis, 39o5, p. i86.
"Slater v. Mexican National R. R. Co. (19o4) 194 U S. 120, x26; 24 Sup. Ct.
581, 583. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., supra. Phillips v. Eyre
(387o, Ex. Ch.) L. R. 6 Q. B. 1, 28; Carr v. Fracis Times & Co. (H. of L.)
[1902] A. C. 376, 18o.
"They could, of course, have successfully made this defense. See Underhill
v. Hernandez, supra.
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ultimately created through their efforts, on the theory that the revolu-
tion represented ab initio a changing national will, crystallizing in the
final successful result."'
The Department of State, of course, may diplomatically contest the
validity or legality of the acts of the Carranza commanders and assert
the liability of Mexico for any acts deemed to have been unlawful
according to Mexican or international law. With respect to the claim
of plaintiff Oetjen, it will be recalled that he derived it, with his alleged
title, by assignment from a Mexican citizen. His claim, therefore,
would seem to be barred by the rule that the "right" of governmental
interposition cannot be created by the assignment of a claim by a
foreigner to a citizen and that the Department of State will not espouse
a "nationalized" claim which came into American hands after it had
accrued.15 This rule would not, of course, affect the claim of the
American Metal Co., which appears to have had title to the property at
the time it was requisitioned. The receipt of General Pereyra should
be presented to the Mexican authorities in Mexico.
1 On the merits,
from the meager evidence disclosed by the opinions of the Supreme
Court, it would seem that the contribution in the Oetjen case and the
requisition in Ricaud v. The American Co. were properly levied accord-
ing to the rules of international law.
E. M. B.
THE RELATION OF THE LAW OF THE DOMICIL TO THE CAPACITY OF A
MARRIED WOMAN TO MAKE A PERSONAL CONTRACT
Louisiana abides by the rule that a married woman's capacity, to
"Williams v. Bruffy (1878) 96 U. S. 176; Bolivar Railway Co. (Gt. Brit.) v.
Venezuela, Feb. 17, 19o3, Ralston's Venezuelan Arbitrations, 388, 394.
"6 Moore, Digest of International Law, 982; Borchard, Diplomatic Protection
of Citizens Abroad, 661. The rule has frequently been enforced by international
commissions. Borchard, op. cit. 662, note 2.
"GUnder the treaty of 1831 with Mexico, this requisition might have been
regarded by the United States as a forced loan, from which American citizens
were deemed to be, exempt Mr. Fish, Secretary of State, to Mr. Foster, Aug.
15, 1873, 6 Moore, Digest of Int. Law, 916. The United States-Mexican com-
missions' of 1839, 1849 (domestic) and 1868 (until Thornton became umpire),
considered forced loans illegal, and made awards in favor of the claimants.
Thornton held them to be legal, provided they were equally distributed amongst
all the inhabitants, without discrimination. See Borchard, op. cit. 269-27o.
But this treaty was abrogated by notice from Mexico in i881.
'It is as well to attempt definition before proceeding. "Capacity" is used in
this comment to mean the sum of personal qualifications to which the law
attaches power to make a normal contract-one not void for illegality, etc. Or,
to illustrate without defining, when a given person cannot make a contract which
an ordinary person could, capacity is involved. Married women at common
law present the striking example. And such partial survivals of their old dis-
abilities as the law may have left, though perhaps not strictly within the above
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enter into a personal contract is fixed by the law of her domicil,
2 and
this idea of a personal law, whether of domicil or of nationality, which
tails after the person whithersoever he or she may wander, prevails
throughout the Continent of Europe." Not so in the United States.
Here the almost universal rule'is that such capacity in a married woman
is determined as to each individual contract by the law of the place of
making.' The reasons for following the Americari rule in America
are clear and cogent. With a multitude of divergent local laws on
capacity in states between which intercourse is ever increasing; with
no mark of garb or tongue to signal to outsiders the state of any
person's domicil; with ready, accurate advice on the law of a foreign
jurisdiction almost impossible to obtain-decidedly commercial
expediency calls for the application of the law of the place of contract-
ing.5 And apparently that law governs, as it should, the capacity of
infants as well.6
definition-to become surety for one's husband's debt, for instance-are treated
by the courts and will be treated here as relating to capacity.
"Personal contracet' is used to exclude contracts so relating to real estate
that the law of the situs enters into consideration. Nor are marriage contracts
here discussed, as the questions of policy involved in them differ materially from
those playing upon commercial contracts.
'Gamier v. Poydras (1839) 13 La. 177; and see Baer Bros. v. Terry (1902)
io8 La. 597, 32 So. 353.
" Story, Conflict of Laws, sec. 51 ff. And see Prof. E. G. Lorenzen, Conflict
of Laws as to Bills and Notes (1917) I MINN. L. Rrv. 1o, 15-18, and notes, where
the question of capacity is treated at length. Prof. Lorenzen shows, however,
that each of the countries discussed by him applies the lex loci contractus to
contracts made on its own soil. Such an inconsistent exception, to protect
the local citizen, is an interesting and rather amusing parallel to the action of
our own courts in dodging the application of the lex loci when domicil and
forum are one. See infra.
"The rule is stated in greater detail in (igio) 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 764, where
a valuable discussion of the.problem will be found, and where, as in ibid. 774
and (902) 57 L. R. A. 513, the authorities are accurately outlined. It is
important to keep clearly separate the nature and extent of the obligation
(assuming an obligation to exist), which are governed by the "law of the con-
tract;" and the prior question of capacity in the parties, on which depends the
creation of any obligation at all.
I This reasoning applies to the original, typical, and common case where the
parties contract in each other's presence; it is of little force where the contract
is made by correspondence. In the latter case, however, it does not seem that
any reason can be assigned for choosing one law rather than another, which
outweighs the value of uniformity of rule on transactions of one kind. Indeed
the occasional difficulty in determining what a person's domicil is, speaks in
favor of the place of making. Nor does there appear good reason in policy
why a woman should be unable to do by letter or by agent what she can do by
taking her person where she sends the letter. And so the cases. Milliken v.
Pratt (1878) 125 Mass. 374 (letter) ; Bell v. Packard (1879) 69 Me. 1o5 (letter) ;
Chemical Natl. Bk. v. Kellogg (19o) 183 N. Y. 92, 75 N. E. 11o3 (agent).
For further discussion see n. ii.
I Story, op. cit. sec. 8O3; Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Simons (1893, K. C.
App.) 52 Mo. App. 357, 362. Thompson v. Ketcham (i811,, N. Y. Sup. Ct.) 8
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But there are cases which seem to hold capacity to be determined,
as is the extent of the obligation, by the "law of the contract."7 These
same cases s fix as the "law of the contract" that law with a view to
which the parties made their agreement.9 Thus the contractors' inten-
tion would be permitted to determine what system of law fixed their
capacity to contract. This result has been criticised,2° and, we think,
with reason. For the concepts of contractual capacity on the one hand,
and of the realization of individual intention on .the other, can hardly
stand together. It requires existing contractual capacity to give effect
to the parties' intention; that capacity must, by some system of law,
be conferred in advance of the contracting; whence, then, are the
parties to derive the power which this rule gives them to choose for
Johns i9o, is often relied on to this effect; There the law of the domicil was
not considered; an "infant's capacity to contract was held by Chancellor Kent
to be governed by the law of the place of making, but apparently because the
parties intended no other law to govern their contract. The law has not in
general followed the Chancellor in this way of reasoning; there are indications,
though none too free from doubt, that he himself later adopted Story's sounder
view. See 2 Kent, Commentaries, *233 n., *458, *459 n.
'Robinson v. Queen (1889) 87 Tenn. 445, 448, II S. W. 38; Mayer v. Roche
(igog, Ct. Er.) 77 N. J. L. 681, 682, 75 At. 235; International Harvester Co. v.
McAdam (igio) 142 Wis. 114, 119, 124 N. W. iO42; so also apparently Thomp-
son v. Ketcham, supra.
'Except Robinson v. Queen, which declares the law of the place of perform-
ance to govern validity, obligation and capacity. The court there relies in some
strange fashion on Story, sec. 241, citing but taking no heed of it4 essential
complement, sec. 1O3, where capacity is said to be governed "by the law of the
place where the contract is made or the act done." First Natl. Bk. of Geneva v.
Shaw (19o2) iog Tenn. 237, 70 S. W. 8o7, without mention of the earlier case,
repeats much of its language, but quotes further and more carefully from Story,
and apparently shifts to the generally accepted view. In each case, as in the
International Harvester Case, and Thompson v. Ketcham, supra, place of
making and place of performance were one, and a determination of which
governed capacity not therefore necessary to the decision. Basilea v. Spagnuolo
(191o, Sup. Ct.) 8o N. J. L. 88, 77 At. 531, leaves it somewhat doubtful whether
the presumption of intention rule of Mayer v. Roche, supra, still governs capacity
to contract in New Jersey, or whether it is the law of the place of making.
In Baum v. Birchall (1892) 15o Pa. St. 164, 24 Atl. 620, the capacity of a
married woman was said to be governed by the law of the place of perform-
ance. The use of authority was hopelessly loose. Moreover, the place of
performance coincided with that of making, and the contract had to do with
realty there situate. Dulin v. McCaw (1894) 39 W. Va. 721, 20 S. E. 681, sug-
gests an alternative rule, taken from Wharton, Conflict of Laws, secs. 102, 1O4:
that law should govern by which capacity would be enlarged.
'The choice must probably be limited to those systems of law which have
some reasonable connection with the transaction: the place of making, of
performance, of the parties' domicil or citizenship, the situs of the property
involved, or, it may be, of the flag.. Cf. the cases summarized by Prof. J. H.
Beale, Jr. (igog) 23 HARV. L. REv. io2-1o3.
o (i910) 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 764 ff.
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themselves a law which shall at once invest them with capacity and
their contract with validity?11
But whatever the law which governs capacity in a given case,--
whether the law of the place of making as such, or the "law of the 
con-
tract" above discussed,--if that governing law declares a 
woman
capable, her contract's validity so far as concerns capacity will 
be
everywhere upheld, save only where forum and domicil coincide; 
and
so, where that law declares her incapable, will the validity of that con-
tract be everywhere denied, without exception.
1 2
The exception to the first, the active half, of this rule, is but one
phase of the great common exception of conflict of laws: no forum
will lend its aid to enforce a right, contractual or otherwise, whose
enforcement runs counter to what that forum believes vital to its 
own
policy and interest. Against such considerations, say the courts,
"comity" cannot prevail.13 It will be observed that the language is
' Union Natl. Bk. of Chicago v. Chapman (19o2) x69 N. Y. 538, 62 
N. E. 672,
seems to weaken the above argument. There a married woman's 
capacity to
become surety on a note was held determined by the place where her 
contract
was made; her contract in turn was said to be made where the instrument 
was
negotiated in accordance with her intent. It not being shown that 
she intended
the negotiation in a jurisdiction where married women had capacity, the 
note was
held unenforceable against her. The weakness of the decision 
lay in measur-
ing the extent of the agent's power to bind not by the authority 
which he
apparently had, but by that which the court held to have been given him 
in fact.
In Chemical Natl. Bk. v. Kellogg, supra, n. 5, Vann, J., following much 
in the
path of his own dissent in the earlier case, reached the opposite 
result on
facts not distinguishable, and, brought the law on the point into harmony 
with
the ordinary rules of agency. But cf. Basilea v. Spagnuolo, supra, 
n. 8.
But that a woman should be able at her own choice to project 
herself into
capacity abroad: to do by agent (or by letter) a thing which the jurisdiction
within whose bounds she remains denies her capacity to do, is believed 
to be a
real inconsistency, one inherent in any attempt to apply a territorial 
theory
of law to transactions extending beyond the borders of a single state. 
Cf. Free-
man's Appeal (1897) 68 Conn. 533, 37 Atl. 42o, where territorialism 
is applied
in logical perfection, and resultant absurdity. Criticism of the case 
has been
free. See First Natl. Bk. of Chicago v. Mitchell (i89g, C. C. A. 2nd) 
92 Fed.
565. Yet it is submitted that the fault lies not with a 
court which applied with
rare intellectual honesty a theory to which all our courts do homage, 
but in
the theory itself. This is one of the many points on which the nationalist 
theory,
as presented, for example, by Kahn (1898) 39 Iherings Jahrbuecher, 
i; (i899)
40 ibid. i, furnishes a more satisfactory explanation.
See authorities cited below. This rule, and all the generalizations 
in this
comment, are believed applicable equally to contracts void and 
to contracts
voidable for reasons of capacity. Cf. note 6, as to infants' contracts; 
and the
cases in states where married women's contracts are voidable only: 
Armstrong
v. Best (1893) 112 N. C. 59, 17 S. E. i4; Wood v. Wheeler (1892) 1II 
N. C.
231, 16 S. E. 418; First Natl. Bk. of Geneva v. Shaw, supra, n. 8.
1 In the case of foreign judgments, on the other hand, "comity" 
does
decidedly prevail, and this whether or no the judgment be an American 
one which
the full faith and credit clause forces the court to respect. There seems 
to be no
pressing reason why the law of a foreign state should meet less 
respect when
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elastic. Under the strain toward certainty in the conflict of laws,
"comity" has slowly, steadily shifted from a matter of each forum's
whim of the moment toward a growing body of rules which take ever
more definite shape. Of this there is an occasional indication in the
phrasing of opinions. Enforcement of foreign-acquired rights "from
comity, not of strict right,"' 4 will sometimes be replaced by their
enforcement "as matter of right, by . . . universal comity."'15 There
is indeed still tough enough pulling ahead in the state-individualistic
stump-field. Yet in our capacity cases we may expect the policy and
interest of the forum to take on considerable proportions before they
will bar enforcement.
The mere fact that the contract would have been invalid for want of
capacity if made under the forum's local rule will of course not be
enough;16 else no rights not acquired in accordance with local law
could ever hope for recognition. Nor will the additional fact suffice,
that the defendant has since making the contract and before suit
become a resident of the forum, and thus come within its protection;
nor the fact that enforcement is sought out of property lying within
the state.
17
it fixes a primary right by general provision, than when it fixes a secondary
right by determination of an individual case; although the argument for
acknowledging the latter is made somewhat stronger by our policy of avoiding
double litigation. This whole question-the present meaning and the inadequacy
of "comity" as the basis for recognition of foreign law-is cogently treated by
judge John K. Beach, Uniform Interstate Enforcement of Vested Rights (1918)
27 YALE LAw JOURNAL, 656.
"'Holmes v. Reynolds (1883) 55 Vt. 39, 41.
'International Harvester Co. v. McAdam, supra, n. 7, at p. 125.
"Robinson v. Queen, supra, n. 7; Wood-v. Wheeler, supra, n. 12; Merrielles
v. State Bk. of Keokuk (1893) 5 Tex. Civ. App. 483, 24 S. W. 564. In practi-
cally all such cases the domicil, place of making, and place of performance
have coincided; the decisions serve therefore in this connection only to point a
limit beyond which the forum will not insist on its local policy. Hayden v.
Stone (z88o) 13 R. I. io6, which seems contra to the proposition in the text,
was explained away in Brown v. Browning (1886) i5 R. I. 422, 424, 7 Atl. 4o3,
,as referring solely to the remedy. See note 17.
'Meier v. Bruce '(I917, Ida.) 168 Pac. 5. And so Louisiana, too, treats rights
validly acquired by what she considers the governing law. Baer Bros. v; Terry,
supra, n. 2. But it must be noted that courts have denied relief on a wholly
different ground: that their law gave no remedy that was fitting. See for
example Ruhe v. Buck (1894) 124 Mo. 178, 27 S. W. 412, where the question and
the authorities are ably treated on both sides; the case there turned on whether
a married woman of Dakota, where the obligation was contracted and payable,
and where her status was as that of a feme sole for purposes of contract and
suit, should in an attachment proceeding before the Missouri court be treated
as sole or coverte; if the former, the attachment would have been valid; see also
Brown v. Browning, supra, n. 16, and see Bank of Louisiana v. Williams (1872)
46 Miss. 618, 629. Contra, Gibson v. Sublett (1885) 82 Ky. 596. The problem is
delicate and perplexing; though sometimes inseparably interwoven with that
of the forum's policy, it cannot here be discussed. See (19o2) 57 L. R. A. 520.
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It is only when the defendant was domiciled in the forum, at the
time of making the contract,' and the local law gives her no capacity
to make such a contract, that the forum is likely to feel that the pro-
tection of one of its own citizens is involved; in such circumstances it
may well be ready to find in the local restriction of capacity a limit
beyond which it will refuse the enforcement sought; and with some
reason, for concededly such restriction is intended largely to protect
the persons affected. In these cases the forum is the domicil; the local
law applied is the law of the domicil; the cases may therefore seem
offhand to lend color to a confusing
9 theory that the law of the domicil
as such governs a married woman's capacity to make a personal con-
tract. Such is hardly the true bearing of the decisions.
2 0  Refusal of
enforcement is solely in the forum's character as forum, protecting its
own citizens at home by its laws intended for their protection; and not
at all in its character as domicil, as competent to fix everywhere a
woman's capacity to enter, in another state, into a contract valid
generally.
This is shown in many ways. To begin with, the very cases which
refuse enforcement often grant expressly that the contract is good else-
where, naming in particular, as a rule, the place of making.
21 When
suit is brought in a third jurisdiction, either there is not even inquiry
made as to the domicil's law on capacity,
22 or it is held not to govern."
And if it did in truth govern, a contract would necessarily be good-
when capacity was the only issue-whenever the party in question was
capable by the law of her domicil, although incapable by the law of the
place of contracting.2 ' Even in the courts of the domicil the opposite
"And, it may be suggested, is still so domiciled at the time of suit; else the
duty of protection might well be held to have ceased.
",Such a theory need not be articulate in order to confuse. Cf. the undue
stressing of the law of domicil in the principal case, discussed below.
' Cases in this field involve so many elements in such varied combination:
domicil, place of making, of performance, forum, intention of parties, etc.-
that they must be read with care and cited with caution. It is rather startling,
for instance, to find Armstrong v. Best, supra, n. 12, though one of the clearer
opinions, cited in its own headnote as holding that "as to capacity of the con-
tracting party the law of the domicil prevails ;" and cited in the International
Harvester Case, supra, n. 7, at p. 124, as going "upon the obviously erroneous
theory that the law of the forum, as to capacity of the parties to contract,
governs"--when in fact it advances neither proposition, but accepts the law of
the place of making, subject to the exception explained in the text.
' Armstrong v. Best, supra, n. 12, at p. 62; First Nati. Bk. of Geneva v. Shaw,
supra, n. 8, at p. 241; cf. even Freeman's Appeal, supra, n. ii, at p. 541.
' Union Natl. Bk. of Chicago v. Chapman, supra, n. ii.
' Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Westervelt (1879) 52 Conn. 586 (forum
at the place of performance).
"'And so the Louisiana rule. Cf. Gamier v. Poydras, supra, n. 2, which does
not even discuss whether the transaction would have been valid under the local
law of Louisiana; and see Roberts v. Wilkinson (i85o) 5 La. Ann. 369, 373.
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is held.25  Thus it is evident that the domiciliary law of a married
woman's capacity to make a personal contract has in the conflict of
laws in the United States practically no meaning; that it is applied
only in the courts of the domicil itself; and applied there never to
create or enforce rights not recognized eisewhere, but only to give a
protection purely local against the enforcement of rights good abroad,
rights created despite the law of the domicil.
Even in this form the rule must undergo further narrowing. It has
been shown that the domicil's application of its own law on the p6int
is based on policy. What if its policy has changed between the mak-
ing of the contract and the bringing of the suit? In the leading case
in this whole subject, Miliken v. Pratt,6 the Massachusetts court
under those circumstances applied the normal conflict of laws rule: the
law of the place of making. It may be that this case goes "to the
verge of the law ;,,2T yet there seems to be every reason to follow it
thither, as has been done.2 8  How far each state will go, it must of
course settle for itself.29 It is certain that New Jersey has gone far
beyond Milliken v. Pratt. Her position has been that only the sweep-
ing married women's disability of the common law was a rule of
policy; once they are admitted to contract at all, subject only to legisla-
tive direction as to what contracts they shall or shall not have power
to make, the rule of policy has been abrogated in favor of a rule of
discretion; and the fact that a sister state differs from New Jersey in
the exercise of that discretion, is no reason to refuse enforcement, even
against a New Jersey citizen, of a contract validly made under the
capacity laws of that sister state.30 A similar leaning has been shown
in the federal courts. Sitting in Indiana, the court in Bowles v.
Field3 -- approved in First National Bank v. Mitchel132-enforced a
contract valid where made, but void for want of capacity by the law of
Indiana, where the defendant had all along been domiciled. Should
'Nichols and Shepard Co. v. Marshall (1899) io8 Ia. 518, 79 N. W. 282; the
forum as forum merely enforces or refuses to enforce; it never creates.
(1878) 125 Mass. 374.
Holmes, J., in Union Trust Co. of Chicago v. Grosman, discussed below.
Cf. the language in Armstrong v. Best, supra, at p. 62.
'Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Simons, supra, n. 6. Holmes v. Reynolds,
supra, n. 14, adopts the whole reasoning of the Massachusetts court; but there
the woman appears not to have been domiciled in the forum. Contra, Freeman's
Appeal, supra, n. ii.
'And for this reason it is probably true, as stated in (igio) 26 L. R. A. (N.
S.) 775, that "decisions of the courts of other jurisdictions on this point
have rather less than the ordinary value of foreign decisions as precedents."
' So the reasoning in Thompson v. Taylor (1goi, Ct Er.) 66 N. J. L. 253, 49
Ati. 544. This is still law in New Jersey, with the usual reservation of an
attempt to perpetrate a fraud on the law of the state. Mayer v. Roche, supra,
n. 7.
1 (1897, C. C. D. Ind.) 78 Fed. 742; and on rehearing (1897) 83 Fed. 886,
from which opinion, at p. 887, the language in the text is taken.
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the conflict in public policy between the two states be irreconcilable,
the court felt it ought to be governed by "the more liberal policy indi-
cated by the act of Congress abolishing common law disabilities of
married women in the District of Columbia."
But these federal cases must, as regards policy, be considered no
longer precedents in view of the decision of the United States Supreme
Court in Union Trust Co. v. Grosman (1917) 38 Sup. Ct. 147. A
woman domiciled, as the plaintiff apparently knew, in Texas, signed a
guaranty of her husband's note, while she was temporarily in Chicago.
The plaintiff brought its suit in a federal court in Texas, and appealed
from an adverse decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals.3 3 Under
the Illinois local law such a guaranty by a married woman was assumed
to be valid; under the Texas local law it was held to be void. The
Supreme Court held the guaranty unenforceable against the woman or
her separate property, in a court administering Texas law. It was
admitted that the question presented would be a different one if suit
had been brought in Illinois or in a third jurisdiction,-there is, indeed,
no reason to doubt that a decision enforcing the contract in any state
or federal court outside the domiciil would be upheld. The court
further expressly distinguished cases allowing enforcement-although
the contract would not have been good under the local law-where the
defendant was not a citizen of the forum whom its laws were intended
to protect- 4 and distinguished Milliken v. Pratt5 on the ground that
there, although the defendant was a local citizen, the forum's policy
had changed before the bringing of the suit. There is therefore
nothing in the reasoning, nor is there anything in the language of the
court in contradiction with the analysis urged above. The case falls
within the exception: that the domestic policy of the forum may forbid
enforcement of a foreign acquired right3 6
'Supra, n. ii; this case was reversed (igoI) 18o U. S. 471, 21 Sup. Ct. 418,
without discussion of the validity of its reasoning, on the ground that Freetnatv's
Appeal, supra, note ii, had adjudicated the subject matter of the suit.
1(i916, C. C. A. 5th) 228 Fed. 61o.
""It is one thing for a court ,to decline to be an instrument for depriving
citizens belonging to the jurisdiction of their property in ways not intended
by the law that governs them, another to deny its offices to enforce obligations
good by the lex domicilii and the lex loci contractus against women that the
local laws have no duty to protect." (First italics ours.) It will be observed
that the court here-as elsewhere in the opinion-avoids passing on the problem
presented to the third, disinterested jurisdiction when the law of the place of
making conflicts, as to a party's capacity, with the law of the domicil. Here as
elsewhere the opinion squints toward preferring the latter, but apparently with-
out consideration of the cases on the point; for which see nn. 22, 23.
' Supra, n. 26. And it may be noted that Chief Justice Gray in that case, at
p. 383, himself provided for such a distinction. Cf. Ruhe v. Buck, supra, n. 17, at
p. 188.
'And this cause is now res judicata in any other forum. "The precise
matter in issue-the liability of Mrs." in this case, Grosman, "notwithstanding
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But it is undeniable that the tone of the decision is colored by distinct
stress on the law of the domicil as such; a stress believed to be not
in consonance with the language and decisions of the American cases
on the subject. These latter are meagerly noted in the opinion, very
meagerly.3 7  The only federal case clearly in point, for instance,
Bowles v. Field,3 8 is overlooked. This is the more regrettable as the
policy there announced must be regarded as reversed by the principal
case: federal courts sitting in the domicil may no longer, in deciding
whether policy forbids enforcement within a state of contracts made
while abroad by married women" domiciled in the state, look for
guidance to "the liberal policy indicated by Congress;" they must
accept as the governing policy the local law of the state in which they
sit. If this means a wider application of the "policy of the forum"
exception, it -is to that extent unfortunate for the sorely needed
development of the conflict of laws.
To sum up: on its exact facts the decision in the principal case is
clearly sustainable. But extension of the influence of the law of the
domicil as such, suggested in the opinion, seems improbable, and is not
to be desired. For the rule that, subject to the one exception noted,
the law of the place of contracting governs a married woman's capacity
to make a personal contract is too firmly established in America, and
for too good reason.
MUNICIPAL FUEL YARDS
It is hardly open to question, even by the staunchest of conserva-
tives, that socialistic legislation increases apace; in fact the con-
servatives may be the first to concede that advance in order to sound
a note of alarm against its threatened inroads. Such legislation, either
anti-capitalistic or paternalistic, is moreover, receiving to-day more
moderate treatment than during our earlier history at the hands of our
highest tribunal. That mace of conservatism, the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, is less often swung than heretofore to strike down the work of
state legislatures as denying due process of law to the people, and this
tendency is recently illustrated in the case of Jones v. City of Portland
(1918) 38 Sup. Ct. 112. The decision therein is especially timely in
these days of coal shortage and the consequent drastic federal action
we have just experienced, for it answers the question as to whether a
municipality may be constitutionally empowered to operate a fuel yard.
her coverture at the time the guaranty was signed"--has been "adjudicated
against the bank in the courts of" Texas. Mitchell v. First Natl. Bk. of
Chicago (19Ol) i8o U. S. 471, and 483, 21 Sup. Ct 418, and 422. The plain-
tiff's mistake lay in its choice of forum.
' Of cases in this field there are cited six; and of these, one from Louisiana.
'Supra, n. 31.
COMMENTS
If the operation of such a plant by the city for the benefit of its citizens
is a public purpose, a tax may properly be levied to establish and con-
duct the industry exactly as it may be to pave,1 sprinkle2 and light8
the streets or to operate a waterworks.' If the purpose is not public,
as for example, to run a municipal cigar stand or, referring to an
actual case, a plumbing supply store,5 a tax upon the aggrieved public
for the purpose is a taking of property without due process of law.6
In the Portland case the Supreme Court of the United States sustained
the Supreme Court of Maine which had twice upheld unanimously
7
the act in controversy here." A city may sell fuel to its people.9
It is worth noting that this was no emergency measure to meet war-
time conditions. The state statute was passed in 1903, the city
ordinance in 1913, the Maine Supreme Court first upheld its validity
in April, 1914, and the decision of that court in the principal case was
rendered in February, 1915.
With the economic wisdom or unwisdom of government ownership
this comment has primarily nothing to do.10 Nevertheless it is not to
be overlooked that the outcome of particular cases, especially border
line cases, will be greatly influenced by just this consideration. Indeed,
who shall say that the unanimous decision of our Federal Supreme
Court in the principal case may not have been encouraged by a tem-
perature of something less than the governmentally requested 68
'Delphi v. Evans (1871) 36 Ind. go, 96, io Am. Rep. 12, 17; Williamsport v.
Commonwealth (1877) 84 Pa. St. 487, 493, 24 Am. Rep. 208, 212.
'Maydwell v. Louisville (19o3) ii6 Ky. 885, 888, 76 S. W. O91, io92.
'Crawfordsville v. Braden (i8gi) 130 Ind. i49, 28 N. E. 849.
'i Cooley, Taxation (3rd ed.) 217.
'Keen v. Waycross (1897) io Ga. 588, 591, 29 S. E. 42, 43.
'Citizens Saving & Loan Assn. v. Topeka (1874, U. S.) 20 Wall. 655.
'Laughlin v. Portland (914) 111 Me. 486, go Atl. 318; Jones v. Portland
(915) 113 Me. 123, 93 Atl. 41.
'Maine Rev. St (i9o3) ch. 4, sec. 87.
'As indicating the unexpected turn which these decisions have given the law,
it may be observed that such recent works as those following laid it down with-
out criticism or doubt that a city could not enter the fuel business: 3 Dillon,
Mun. Corp. (5th ed.) sec. 1292; 4 McQuillin, Mun. Corp. sec. 18o9; Gray,
Limitation of Taxing Power, sec. 246. The authors based these positive state-
ments of the law on two mere advisory opinions of the Massachusetts Supreme
Court and on one case in Michigan not squarely deciding the point. Opinion
of the Justices (1892) 155 Mass. 598, 30 N. E. 1142 and (19o3) 182 Mass. 605,
66 N. E. 25; Baker v. Grand Rapids (i9o6) 142 Mich. 687, io6 N. W. 208.
"A considerable literature is ranged vigorously on both sides of the question.
See, Douglas Knoop, Principles and Methods of Municipal Trading, London,
1912; Lord Avebury, On Municipal and National Trading, London, 1907; Robert
P. Porter, Dangers of Municipal Trading, London, 1907; Bernard Shaw, The
Common Sense of Municipal Trading, London, i9o8; Municipal Industries of
Glasgow (1895) 9 QUA2. JouP. EcoN. 188; Municipal Ownership in Great
Britain (i9o6) 14 JoUR. POL. EcoN. 257; Municipal Socialism in Scotland (1889)
I JtRrD. REV. 33.
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degrees in the justices' own apartments, or a rapidly dwindling bin
of coal in the regions below? Perhaps the legislation in question would
not have been upheld if it had been contested a few years ago when
economic conditions in the coal industry were not brought so forcibly
to public attention. Certainly it would not have been upheld very
many years ago.
But in the legal aspect some effort will be directed toward finding
the where and why of the rather irregular fenceline between the fields
of public and private enterprise,--irregular because courts have set
single fence posts according to different surveys of this whole section of
the law. Despite the irregularity, however, the cases are susceptible
of a rather rough classification which will be undertaken herein.
In proceeding to enquire what kinds of enterprise a state or
municipality may enter, no more than passing mention need be made
of a first type, the purely governmental functions, and the provision
of facilities for their exercise. It is peifectly clear that governments
must perform the former and provide the latter, and equally clear that
taxes may be levied for these purposes.
A second type of governmental enterprise may be called the police
regulation type, and is illustrated by the liquor dispensary cases.1"
Under the police power as a protection to the public, liquor selling may
be stringently regulated. The sale of liquor by the state is an alterna-
tive to intensive regulation, and a means to the same end. The state's
object in selling liquor is not to quench thirst at reasonable rates, but,
in the interest of health and morals, to control and check public con-
sumption. Perhaps for our purpose, municipal milk stations should
be classed with liquor dispensaries. If so, it is because public health
is likewise the primary objective there. The governmental action is
aimed at providing pure milk to people who otherwise would get an
unsanitary product from dealers who sold cheap.12 Reasonableness of
price is incidental. The principal case hardly falls in this class.
A third type of governmental enterprise may be called the free
supply type. There are some things regarded as necessary or valuable
to society which either would not be supplied at all by private business
' See Freund, Police Power, sec. 218, where the statutes of South Carolina
and three other states are discussed.
On police regulation of milk distribution see (1916) 26 YALE LAW JouRNAL,
67. The element of purity is frequently brought into cases of municipal
water supply. See Lumbard v. Stearns (1849 Mass.) 4 Cush. 6o, 62; Smith v.
Nashville (18go) 88 Tenn. 464, 469, 12 S. W. 924, 925. It was also introduced
by block and tackle methods to support a Georgia town in selling ice. Holton
v. Camilla (igio) 134 Ga. 560, 567, 68 S. E. 472, 476. Cf. State V. Thompson
(1912) 149 Wis. 488, 521, 137 N. W. 20, 33 and Union Ice & Coal Co. v. Ruston
(1914) 135 La. 898, 918, 66 So. 262, 269. The element of safety, also falling
under this head of police power, was used in a decision upholding a city's
right to supply individuals with electric illumination,--easily supportable on
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firms, or would be so indifferently supplied,u or would necessarily cost
so much, that a substantial part of the population would be inadequately
served or would go without altogether, if the government did not go
into the business and offer a free supply. Examples are plentiful.
Free public schools, hospitals, libraries, art galleries, parks and play-
grounds have long been accepted as proper governmental activities.14
Service entirely without charge, though common in this class of
activities, is obviously not essential. On exactly the same principles,
service might be and sometimes is furnished, not free, but at cost or
less than cost.
The net result in most instances is to charge on the public generally
the cost or part of the cost of serving each individual. The emphasis
in this class is, therefore, not on the immediate benefit to the individual
served, but on the interest of the community at large in having such
service rendered to each individual. Hence in some instances, such as
the public schools and the fire department, service is not only furnished
free but its acceptance is made compulsory. How far the principles
governing this class of activities can be invoked to justify the fuel
yard decision will be discussed below.
There remains a long list of public necessities, including food, fuel,
clothing, water, light, transportation, mechanical power, etc., as to
which the public necessity does not require that the enjoyment of
service be compulsory, or that service be free at public expense, or
even that it be provided at less than a reasonable commercial rate. It
requires only that these necessities be available to all at reasonable
prices.
Now under free competition in business, both prices and service to
all comers are supposed by the judges to look after themselves for
the most part. The reason why Smith, the grocer, will charge about
the same price for brick butter or dried prunes as does his competitor
up the street, is found in this very word competitor. When competi-
tion brings reasonable prices for necessities and service to all (and
when public control is not necessary for adequate police regulation, as
in our second class) the government has no need to regulate. And
the government has even less interest in regulating or controlling the
sale of luxuries. There is no great public good to come from requir-
ing that poodle dogs and diamond tiaras be sold at reasonable rates to
all comers.
But public interest is aroused when the business in question deals
with the necessities of life, and when competitive conditions do not
exist, so that there is no natural stimulus to serve all and keep prices
other grounds as discussed below. Crawfordsville v. Braden (i8g) 130 Ind.
149, 159, 28 N. E. 849, 852.
' See Perry v. Keene (1876) 56 N. H. 514, 533 (highways).
ti Cooley, Taxation (3rd ed.) pp. 198 and 2o5; Attorney Genl. v. Burrell
(1875) 31 Mich. 25, 31; Salisbury Land & Improvement Co. v. Commonwealth
(1913) 215 Mass. 371, 374, 1O2 N. E. 619, 621.
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within bounds. It is then that the business is said to be affected with
a public interest. It becomes a "public calling."'1
5  The proprietors
are required by law, instead of as a natural outcome of competition, to
serve, all comers, and at rates which may be fixed by the government.
History illustrates this. In our early law many of the most ordinary
private occupations, as we now view them, were held to be affected
in this way. The law of public callings included the surgeon, the
blacksmith and the tailor and included them probably because of (i)
the public necessity of their services and (2) the then scarcity of such
persons in most communities.' They are no longer included among
our public callings because, although the comparative necessity con-
tinues that the public be thus served, there is no general scarcity now:
there exists no virtual monopoly in those callings.Y7
But though conditions have changed, the test remains the same for
public regulation of rates, and service to all comers, despite the
reliance in many difficult cases on other auxiliary arguments, which
only serve to confuse the issue, and which have been conscripted to
support faltering opinions.'
'Allnutt v. Inglis (18io K. B.) x2 East 527; Munn v. Illinois (1876) 94 U.
S. 113; Zanesville v. Z. Gas Lt. Co. (1889) 47 Oh. St 1, 33, 23 N. E. 55, 6o;
State v. Edwards (1893) 86 Me. 102, 105, 29 At. 947; Cotting v. Kansas City
Stk. Yds. Co. (1897 C. C. D. Kan.) 82 Fed. 85o, 852.
"Wyman, Public Service Corp., sec. 6-8.
'Other callings, once classified as public, have remained in that class, through
the law's conservatism, or on the principle of stare decisis, though if the ques-
tion were new they might not now be so classified. See Laughlin v. Portland,
supra, note 7, at p. 491, and cases there cited. The innkeeper is perhaps another
example. See Freund, Police Power, sec. 388.
' Sometimes considerable emphasis is placed upon "holding out" to do
business with the public generally. This element may be important to the
decision of a particular case but it should not be misunderstood. If holding
out were a determining factor, the exquisite example of a public enterprise
would be the cheap clothing store whose proprietor holds forth on the sidewalk
urging all comers to buy at tremendous bargains. But once it has been settled
that an industry is in the public class, holding out becomes important to deter-
mine whether the particular individual concerned is conducting the business
on a public basis. Carriers are generally in public service but there are private
carriers as well, who do not hold out to serve all and who, therefore, are not
subject to public regulation. Another point is often raised in cases both of
regulation and of governmental operation, namely, the necessity of legislative
act. During the anthracite strike in Pennsylvania in 1902, agitation for govern-
mental intervention ,vas opposed by this argument, that there had been no
legislation. (19o2) 36 AM. L. REv. 916, 917. In the case of cities, whose powers
are confessedly limited, this may be a deciding factor. Spaulding v. Peabody
(i8gi) 153 Mass. 129, 26 N. E. 421. But this should not be thought to determine
whether a business is or is not public. The validity of a statute (to be decided
by the courts) depends upon whether the enterprise which is the subject of the
legislation is in fact a public enterprise. To say that the statute makes the
subject public is to say that the legislation validates itself,-the old process of
lifting by bootstraps. This lack of clearness,-the failure to cut sharply
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Now another way of securing reasonable prices to the public, besides
fixing the charges of private firms, is for the government to embark
in the business itself; and this gives us a fourth class of governmental
activities. Municipal light and water plants are common. And the
City of Cleveland chose this means to provide its people with a three-
cent car fare. Hence it is that the question of what business a govern-
ment may itself operate to secure reasonable rates and non-discriminat-
ing service is closely related to the question of what business it may
regulate for the same purpose.'9 These tests of public necessity and
virtual monopoly have been generally applied to cases of governmental
control and seem nearly always to be present and applicable as well to
cases of governmental operation.20  As used in the cases, the phrase
"public necessity" is self-explanatory; not so the phrase "virtual
monopoly," upon whose application certain limitations have been more
or less generally recognized.
The first limitation enters in connection with the element of time.
That may be a monopoly to-day which was not yesterday, and the con-
between the questions of whether legislation is necessary before the court will
act and whether the business is public so that legislation would be valid if
enacted,--is to be observed in the following cases both of control and govern-
mental operation. Keen v. Waycross (1897) ioi Ga. 588, 591, 29 S. E. 42, 43
(city entering the plumbing supply business) ; Mobile v. Yuille (1841) 3 Ala.
137, 142-143, 36 Am. Dec. 441, 446 (regulation of the price of bread) ; Delaware
Lack. & Wn. R. R. v. Central Stk. Yds. & Trans. Co. (1889) 45 N. J. Eq. 50,
62, I7 Atl. 146, 151 (bill to require Hoboken stock yards to serve all comers,
particularly complainant; no statute; dismissed). Note, however, the clearer
discussion of this point in the dissenting opinion of Dixon, J. in the case last
cited, on rehearing (I8go) 46 N. J. Eq. 28o, ig At. i85. And see American
Live Stk. Coin. Co. v. Chicago Live Stk. Exch. (1892) 143 Ill. 21o, 238, 239, 32
N. E. 274, 282 (membership in exchange not open to all comers), where the
usual necessity for a statute was explained by remarking the practical diffi-
culty of placing on the courts the first determination of whether a particular
business is public. Cf. Spaulding v. Lowell (1839 Mass.) 23 Pick. 7I. In one
practical way legislation does make that public which was private before. There
is a strong presumption that legislation is valid, rebuttable only by a very clear
case. Perry v. Keene (1876) 56 N. H. 514, 534. Within this presumptive belt
between what the judges themselves think about the matter and what they
would concede to be a possible view of other reasonable men, the legislature
does settle finally that an enterprise is public.
" See Burlington v. Beasley (1876) 94 U. S. 31o, 314; Opinion of the Justices
(1892) I55 Mass. 598, 3o N. E. 1142; Wyman, Pub. Service Corp. sec. 218,
note I.
' State v. Thompson, supra, note 12, at p. 521; Crawfordsville v. Braden, supra,
note 3; State v. Toledo (i8gi) 48 Oh. St 112, 26 N. E. io6i. The virtual
identity of the two questions-what business a government may regulate and
what it may operate-when the only public object to be secured by government
operation is service to all at reasonable commercial rates, is, however,
often obscured by confusing these cases with those involving other distinct
classes of governmental activities, such as those discussed above, which are
justified on quite different grounds.
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verse is equally true.21 Where there is something of permanence about
the monopolistic condition, the case is clear enough, but it is not so
clear where a mere temporary emergency exists, say, a monopoly
because of a one season crop failure, a transportation congestion, or
a strike at the source of supply. The Opinion of the Justices22 which
has been noticed as opposing municipal dealing in fuel, even under
legislative authority, expressly differentiated between ordinary and
emergency conditions. It conditionally seemed to approve municipal
action in the latter case. On the other hand, though the Portland case,
by authorizing the sale of fuel in season and out of season, might
seem to go much further, it has been thought by a writer in one
periodical not to authorize mere emergency sales.23  There is no ques-
tion but that conditions for the public become urgently serious in brief
emergencies. Governmental interference, however, may be almost as
serious as the emergency; and when emergency is the reason for
governmental interference, it should likewise be the reason judicially
assigned for sustaining municipal action. No effort should be made
to crowd the business into the field of those affected with a public
interest by decisions which in terms would justify permanent control,
where only temporary relief is needed. Emergency action, limited by
the extent of the emergency, may perhaps constitute a fifth class of
permitted governmental activities. 2 - But as a test of public callings,
with all the broad legal consequences that follow from that classifica-
'The conditions which justified the decisions in the grain elevator cases were
said to have been developing over a period of 20 years. Munn v. Illinois, supra,
note 15, at pages 131-132. It has been suggested that conditions are pursuing a
contrary tendency in cases under the mill acts. Laughlin v. Portland (1914)
iii Me. 486, 491-492, go Atl. 318, 32o. The importance of this observation lies
in the fact that there is no need for precedent to establish a public use. Munn
v. Illinois, supra (regulation); Sun Printing & Publ. Assn. v. New York
(1896) 8 N. Y. App. Div. 230, 40 N. Y. Supp. 607 (municipal ownership).
And conversely (though to a lesser degree because of the doctrine of stare
decisis) the fact that there is precedent, particularly old precedent, should not
settle that a business is public now. Compare the cases of the surgeon, the
tailor and the blacksmith referred to above.
= (igo3) 182 Mass. 6o5, 6Io, 66 N. E. 25, 26.
"(1918) 86 CENT. L. JouR. 21, 22.
Obviously no attempted ciassification in a growing subject can claim to be
complete and final. No such claim is made for the classification in the text.
It may be worth while noting, however, that there are municipal or state
activities which are purely incidental and which, if undertaken independently,
might not be justified. They may be incidental in one of two ways. First, they
may be an appropriate aid to accomplishing a proper governmental undertaking,
as for example, the operation of a quarry in connection with the paving of
streets. See, Schneider v. Menasha (19o3) 118 Wis. 298, 95 N. W. 94. Second,
they may utilize a by-product of a governmental industry. Cf. Holton v. Camilla,
supra, note 12, with the language of Lumpkin, P. J. in Keen v. Waycross, supra,
note 5. A city might sell coke from a municipal gas works.
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tion, we conclude that "virtual monopoly" in the legal usage must be
something more than an obviously temporary monopoly.
Another and most important qualification is that monopoly must be
an inherent tendency of the business. There may chance to be but
one clothing store in a town; clothing is a comparative necessity, at
least in most latitudes where the due process clause of the American
Constitution can be invoked; but the clothing business is not because
of this circumstance made subject to price regulation nor to the serve-
all-comers rule,-that is, it is not made a public calling,-for there
is nothing about the clothing business itself to make free competition
difficult.2 5 Potential competition may be almost as effective a check
as actual competition.
This requirement of an inherent tendency in the business,-often
expressed by saying that it must be a "natural monopoly,"-has an
important application to another kind of monopoly which is familiar
to-day and popularly hated, that of combination. In a field wherein
competition is readily possible (at least in theory) and wherein the
monopoly is solely the result of the action of one or more powerful
corporations in buying out competitors, or controlling the market by
the use of unfair methods or any of the various modem devices for
stifling competition,-in other words where it is a purely artificial
monopoly,-the industry does not thereby become clothed with a
public interest.28 The remedy is to be sought by breaking up the
monopoly.
27
' Conversely, a hundred hotels in a great commercial center do not take
the innkeeper out of his legal classification, nor does a choice of several rail-
road lines between some cities make railroad transportation a private calling.
An inherent tendency to monopoly in a business usually results in a generality
of that monopoly. But how far generality may be regarded as a test of
virtual monopoly is not apparent. The rule of the grain elevator cases, first
applied in Munn v. Illinois, supra, note 15, and Budd v. New York (1892) 143
U. S. 517, 12 Sup. Ct 468, to the strategically important grain ports, was later
extended on the authority of those cases to small towns in North Dakota.
Brass v. No. Dakota (1894) 153 U. S. 391, 14 Sup. Ct 857, affirming State v.
Brass (1892) 2 N. D. 482, 52 N. W. 408. But, in the state court decision, the
Chief Justice, while yielding to the majority, observed that perhaps the rule
applicable to the large centers should not be applied to cases wherein the facts
were so different. His view is persuasive. Classification within a particular
industry seems reasonable.
:'This limitation has been so generally accepted and observed that express
decisions on the point are few. -See, however, Ladd v. Southern Cotton Press
& Mfg. Co. (188o) 53 Tex. 172, i8g; American Live Stk. Corn. Co. v. Live Stk.
Exch., supra, note 8, at p. 236-237. It is implied in the many references in the
authorities to "natural" and "legal" monopoly.
" It does not follow that in certain lines of business where an existing ten-
dency to monopoly is now popularly attributed to artificial combination, we
may not yet recognize that the tendency is, in fact, inherent-in the economic
and geographical conditions affecting the business and, abandoning the effort to
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Monopoly must then, we conclude, where it is to serve as a test, be
(i) reasonably permanent, (2) inherently characteristic of the busi-
ness, and (3) not merely the result of artificial methods of combination
or of stifling competition. Such a monopoly, plus a public necessity,
must, it would seem, be present to permit either governmental fixation
of prices or governmental serve-all-comers regulation, or governmental
operation solely as a means to these ends.
What then of the principal case, wherein the city of Portland was
authorized to sell fuel to its inhabitants? In which of our four classes
must we find room for this latest addition to the list of lawful municipal
activities? We have seen that it clearly is not within either of the
first two classes. Is it then to be placed in class three or class four?
The chief distinction between the two is that, in the former class, the
public interest in the general enjoyment of some service or commodity
of public necessity or advantage is thought to require that it be
furnished not merely at a reasonable commercial rate, but on still more
favorable terms,--either without charge or on better than a business
basis; while in the latter class all that is deemed necessary to the public
interest is a reasonable commercial rate. In class three, therefore,
there need be no monopolistic element. The freest commercial
competition will not, at least for any length of time, maintain prices
at a level that does not allow a business profit. In class four, on the
contrary, it is at least the present theory of our law that free competi-
tion will result in reasonable commercial rates; if these are all the
situation demands, the monopoly element must be present to require
or justify governmental action.
The opinion of the Supreme Court is not illuminating. It emphasizes
the great weight to be given in such cases to the opinions of the state
courts, quotes at some length from the first Maine decision in which
the ordinance in question was upheld,
28 and concludes by comparing
the furnishing of heat with the furnishing of light and water, and the
furnishing of coal for heating with the furnishing, of natural gas for
the same purpose. 29 By the analogies relied on, it seems therefore to
treat the case as one of "public calling," coming within our class four.
That "heat is as indispensable to the health and comfort of the people
as is light or water" may be conceded. But the statement, in effect,
that it makes no difference by what means or systems heat is
furnished is not so readily to be accepted. The business of furnishing
water, electric light, or gas-whether natural or artificial and whether
for light or for heat-is a public calling because the necessary
restore competition by legal compulsion, substitute governmental regulation
under the law of public callings or the alternative remedy of government oper-
ation. The packing house, for example, may follow in the footsteps of the
grain elevator.
' Laughlin v. Portland, supra, note 7.
' State v. Toledo (189) 48 Oh. St. 125, 26 N. E. lo61.
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machinery for distribution through the public streets makes free
competition impracticable. Not only is the duplication of such systems
economically wasteful, resulting in higher rather than lower charges to
the public, but recognizing this, the public authorities generally refuse
to grant the necessary permission for such duplication. There results
not only a natural, but in most cases a legal monopoly.30
It is true also, as pointed out in the Laughlin case, that a purpose
may be public though no governmental permission for the use of
the streets is had or needed. But, if applied to "public callings," this
merely proves that the monopolistic element need not always be sup-
plied in the same way. It does not answer the objection that, to bring
the case of the fuel yard within the same principle as the electric light
or water or natural gas company, that element must in some way be
supplied. The Laughlin case, in a passage not quoted by the Supreme
Court,3 1 finds the monopoly element in the alleged existence of
"monopolistic combinations" controlling "the mining, transportation
and distribution of coal." That monopoly artificially maintained by
combination will not satisfy the test of a public calling has already been
pointed out. But furthermore, the legislation in question was not
directed at mining or transportation; it dealt only with retail distribu-
tion. It would not be difficult to argue that the mining of coal, or at
least of anthracite coal, if that may be treated as a distinct commodity
for which there is no really equivalent substitute, is under present condi-
tions, not merely by artificial combination, but by the inherent tendency
of natural and economic conditions, a virtual monopoly ;32 but if so
there is no magic in a municipal coal yard as a remedy for this condi-
tion.33  Neither the Maine court nor the federal Supreme Court
specifically declared that a monopoly of the business of selling coal at
retail existed in Portland, or even that there was ground to infer or
presume the existence of such a monopoly; still less, that any conditions
were shown or suggested which would create an inherent tendency to
such monopoly, or place it beyond the reach of state laws against
artificial combination. Retail coal yards may not spring up quite as
easily on every street corner as retail groceries or drug-stores or
clothing stores; but there are no practical requirements of locality or
equipment or even of large capital which would seem to place the busi-
ness outside the operation of the usual laws of competition.
34
"State v. Thompson, supra, note 12, at p. 521; Crawfordsville v. Braden,
supra, note 3; Zanesville v. Gas Light Co., supra, note 15.
"Laughlin v. Portland, supra, at p. 499.
"See (1902) 14 Green Bag, 514 and 570; Freund, Police Power, sec. 373,
note 4. Cf. State v. Loomis (1893) 115 Mo. 307, 320, 22 S. W. 350, 353;
Millett v. People (1886) 117 Ill. 294, 303, 7 N. E. 631, 635:
"See Opinion of the Justices (19o3) i82 Mass. 605, 61o, 66 N. E. 25.
"It must not be overlooked that the Maine court limited its discussion of
monopoly to a consideration of the economic conditions in the coal industry,
56
YALE LAW JOURNAL
The opinion in the Laughlin case seems finally to rest on inadequacy
of supply, with a recurrence to the analogy of the water company. The
cause of the inadequacy is declared to be immaterial. But the cause
is clearly material in determining whether the proposed remedy has any
reasonable relation to the object by which it is sought to be justified.
A public water supply furnishes a real remedy for the inadequacy of
private supply. No attempt is made to show us how a municipal fuel
yard will increase the supply of coal. 5
It is believed that a much stronger case could be made out for
the legislation in question by invoking the underlying principle of
class three, rather than of class four; and that a public hospital
furnishes a better analogy, though less speciously apparent, than a
natural gas company. The public hospital is maintained, not primarily
for the well-to-do, who would secure reasonably adequate medical care
without it, but because there is a large section of the public, especially
in large cities, who could not or would not afford such care without
public assistance. So it might not unreasonably be contended and
believed that there is a considerable section of the public, made up
of the poorer classes in northern cities, who are not in fact under
commercial conditions adequately supplied with coal in winter weather
at prices they can afford to pay. Those who live from hand to mouth
nearly always pay most for everything they buy. The poor buy coal
in small quantities, which it hardly pays the dealer to handle, except
at prices aggregating much more per ton than the more prosperous
consumer is obliged to pay. Nor is it wholly a question of inability
to pay a fair commercial price for the quantity purchased. The line
between class three and class four may not always be clear cut. So
far as the poor are concerned, especially in times of shortage, competi-
tion partially breaks down, because the basket trade is hardly worth
competing for. Thus though there may be no monopoly, though
competition, actual and potential, may sufficiently regulate the price to
the well-to-do, and ensure them service, it may fail entirely to protect
the poor man who wants but a hodful or two of coal. Indeed it is
competition, in another aspect, from which he suffers; he cannot
compete with the prosperous charge customer for even his little share
of the supply available.
A statute or an ordinance, then, that sought to ensure the poor an
unfailing supply of coal in such quantities as they could or would
afford to buy, even at prices that would yield a fair business profit,
might perhaps be justified, if reasonably adapted to the end in view.
Such a case would be on the border-line between class three and class
although both the statute and the ordinance in question specifically provided
for the sale of wood as well. The latter business is, if anything, even less
monopolistic than the retail selling of coal.
'Cf. Opinion of the Justices, supra, note 33, and dissenting opinion of
Loring, J.
COMMENTS
four, obtaining some support from the principles of each. The
legislation in the instant case, considered as a provision for the poor,
came even more directly within the principles of class three, since
it provided for sale at cost, or in other words, at less than a reasonable
commercial rate.
The objection to the legislation, and to the implications of the
opinions in which it was sustained, is that neither statute nor ordinance
was limited to any particular class of trade, nor was any such limita-
tion imposed by the decisions. To require an investigation of the
financial ibility of each customer might be impracticable; but this
would not be necessary. By restricting the business to sales in small
quantities, the only need which, it would seem, could justify the legis-
lation, would be amply provided for, and the practical effect of this
restriction would adjust the remedy to the disease as closely as can be
expected in practical legislation.
It does not follow that even without such a restriction either
statute or ordinance should have been held wholly invalid. The
decisive question might well be what action the city had actually taken
or proposed to take under the ordinance. In spite of popular language,
constitutional decisions do not deal with the abstract validity of
statutes, but with the legality of action taken or proposed in reliance
on the statute for authority or justification. If the actual operation
of the municipal yard had been governed by the considerations above
suggested, the taxpayers' objections might well be overruled, even
though the language of both statute and ordinance might go much
further than the case actually presented, and beyond what the court
could properly approve. But if it appeared that under the authority
of these enactments the city had entered without restriction into the
business of supplying at cost all the coal requirements of the
community, domestic and industrial, for rich and poor, in small
quantities and in large, another case would be presented. It is believed
that the subject must have further consideration, and that distinctions
must be observed of which there is no hint in the opinion under dis-
cussion, before the law can be considered as settled, or the real mean-
ing and effect of the Supreme Court's decision can be measured.
There is little doubt, however, that the tendency of the times is toward
a considerable extension of governmental activities in the line of so-
called social legislation, and that there may be worse shocks in store
for the conservatives than any they have suffered from the judicial
approval of municipal coal yards.38
"For a recent review of the principal case, see, Is Government Merchandising
Constitutional? (1918) 52 Am. L. REV. 215. Other discussions of the same gen-
eral subject and of related cases not here considered will be found in (1915)
15 COLUMBIA L. REV. 179; (1914) 2 VA. L. REv. 152; (1913) 12 MICH. L. Rv.
132; (I903) I6 HARV. L. REV. 584; (i8gi) 5 HARV. L. REv. 30; (1873) 21
Am. L. RFG. 493, note.
